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1 Greenwood and Smith (1997)
offer what may be the most 
reasonable compromise on the
question of causality: a model 
in which ﬁnancial markets arise
after some period of real devel-
opment, and in which the
expansion of those markets
fuels further real growth.  A 
logical implication of this model
is that exogenous creation of a
ﬁnancial system with advanced
features may not spur real
growth.  The problem then for
implementing development 
policy is determining how to 
get poor countries to the point
at which ﬁnancial systems will
arise endogenously.
2Most recently, Calomiris (1995)
has advanced this idea.
3For a review of the literature 
on British banking and indus-
trial development, see Collins
(1991).  Also see Capie and
Collins (1992).  For a critical
appraisal of the British banking
system, see Edwards (1987).












egulation of the ﬁnancial system has
occupied economists and policymak-
ers since the beginning of ﬁnancial 
history.  Such attention has been warranted
because of the crucial role of these institu-
tions in economic life.  There remains,
however, much disagreement over the
ways ﬁnancial and real variables interact
and the extent to which ﬁnancial develop-
ment can promote economic growth.
Modern growth theory has made strides 
in modeling the relationship between
ﬁnancial development and economic
growth, but a causal relationship is 
difﬁcult to verify empirically.1
Despite the burgeoning research on
ﬁnance and growth, the importance of
ﬁnancial-system structure has yet to be
determined.  Much of the debate over
banking reform in the United States 
hinges on the assumption that certain
types of ﬁnancial systems allocate an econ-
omy’s resources more efﬁciently than
others.  There is a widespread sense in 
the United States and Great Britain that 
the universal banking systems of Germany 
and Japan have given those countries an
advantage in industrial development and
economic growth over much of the past
150 years.
The structure of the German banks, in
particular, has been viewed as a key ingre-
dient in Germany’s industrial development
before World War I.  Universal banking,
because it combines all phases of ﬁnance
in one institution, is thought by many to
have yielded economies of scope and greater
efﬁciency.  Such efﬁciency has been argued
in turn to have increased the volume and
reduced the costs of ﬁnance, thus pro-
moting industrial investment.2 Furthermore,
German banks are often assumed to have
maintained close, long-term relationships
with industrial ﬁrms.  Equity positions are
thought to have aligned the incentives of
banks and ﬁrms and encouraged multi-
period optimization of their behavior.  In
contrast, a long line of detractors has chas-
tised the British banks for avoiding engage-
ment with domestic industry and leaving
ﬁrms to seek ﬁnancing from other sources.
Firms’ resultant recourse to securities 
markets is argued to have served investors’
short-term proﬁt motives at the expense of
long-term growth.3 As a result, the banks
have been blamed for the apparent under-
performance of the British economy since
the late nineteenth century.  
Two lines of historical investigation
may shed light on the continuing debates
over the relative efﬁcacy of German and
British banking systems.  The ﬁrst step is
to determine whether the German banks
offered the advantages that have been
ascribed to them; the second step is to
ascertain whether the provision of these
services by universal banks fueled economic
growth.  In comparing the two systems,
however, it is important to acknowledge
that the British banks were not prohibited
from combining functions or from pur-
suing long-term relationships with industrial
firms.  Thus, research on the real effects of
ﬁnancial structure must accept that, if the
British banks’ organization and activities
were suboptimal for industrial growth,
such inefﬁciency stemmed from market
failures of one sort or another: rationing
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relatively low-return or high-risk ven-
tures or failing to perceive or act upon
favorable prospects.  
This study uses aggregate bank balance
sheet data to investigate systematic differ-
ences in the ﬁnancial makeup and activities
of universal and specialized banks.  By
explicitly comparing British and German
banks, it takes steps toward quantifying the
possible disparity in ﬁnancial-system growth
effects over the decades leading up to World
War I.  Financial systems are thought to
inﬂuence both the quantity and quality of
investment.  Thus, this paper ﬁrst measures
the rate of expansion and the ultimate mag-
nitude of capital mobilized by British and
German banks.  The study then investigates
the makeup of the banks’ asset portfolios
and estimates the extent of direct involve-
ment by the two types of banks in 
equity ownership.
The ﬁndings suggest that, compared 
to British banks, German banks maintained
at least as much liquidity relative to their
short-term liabilities, mobilized a smaller
share of the economies’ capital, and held
approximately the same (small) proportion
of their assets in the form of nongovernment
securities.  Furthermore, the German banks
seem to have held only a limited number of
industrial equities in their portfolios and
often did so merely because of insufﬁcient
markets for new issues.
The results offer insights into both 
differences and similarities in the organiza-
tion of banking in Germany and the United
Kingdom, speciﬁcally, and into the historical
importance of ﬁnancial structure, more gen-
erally.  The ﬁndings suggest that the gulf
between specialized and universal banking
in terms of their inﬂuence on economic
growth and industrial development is 
less than commonly believed.
THE LINK BETWEEN BANK
STRUCTURE AND GROWTH
The primary purpose of banks is to
mobilize otherwise idle resources for use
in productive investment.  A wide array 
of theoretical models has appeared in the
growth and development literature in the
past decade to formalize the link between
financial-system functioning and the growth
of the real economy.4 In comparison to the
traditional growth models—in which output
was seen as a function of capital, labor, and
disembodied technological progress—the
current models provide a richer frame-
work for interpreting the potential impact
of ﬁnancial systems.  For their motivation,
nearly all appeal to the observed correla-
tions between ﬁnancial-system develop-
ment and industrial growth uncovered by
economic historians and development
economists during the 1960s and ’70s.5
Pagano (1993) provides a simple way to
summarize the newer models of ﬁnance and
growth.  Using several simplifying assump-
tions, the model yields the growth rate of
output per capita as a function of three vari-
ables: savings rate, return on investment,
and costs of intermediation.  Thus, ﬁnancial
institutions may enhance economic growth
by raising the total quantity of ﬁnancial cap-
ital available to entrepreneurs, improving
the quality (productivity) of investments,
and increasing the efﬁciency of intermedia-
tion (lowering costs) between the sources
and uses of funds.
This framework can help in comparing
the effectiveness of the German and British
banking systems, but further reﬁnement is
required to clarify the ways ﬁnancial insti-
tutions affect the variables in the growth
formula.  The following sections take some
ﬁrst steps at comparing the impact of spe-
cialized and universal banking systems on
the quantity and quality of investment.
QUANTITY OF INVESTMENT
Banks inﬂuence the accumulation of
physical capital by directing funds to entre-
preneurs who wish to invest.  Such capital
mobilization proceeds in two stages: capital
collection through deposit-taking or sales
of equity shares, and fund dispersal through
loans or advances.  By repeating this process,
the banking system multiplier expands the
money supply and redistributes the econo-
my’s capital.  These banking functions
increase the share of resources targeted to
productive investment.
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The German universal banks are cred-
ited with mobilizing signiﬁcant amounts of
capital from the public and thereby pro-
moting industrial growth.  The British banks,
by comparison, are typically presumed to
have participated less aggressively in the
accumulation of funds.  Total assets of ﬁnan-
cial institutions as a share of gross national
product grew substantially in both Britain
and Germany between 1860 and 1913, but
Goldsmith’s (1969) ﬁgures indicate that this
ratio expanded more in the latter than in the
former.  Furthermore, while Britain’s ratio
exceeded Germany’s in 1860, the British
lagged the Germans by 1900.  The gap 
grew to over 50 percent by World War I.6
Nonetheless, the Goldsmith data indicate
that the British deposit banks accounted for
a greater share of their country’s GNP than
did the German universal banks at each
point in the pre-war era.
In Germany, virtually all of the func-
tions relating to corporate ﬁnance fell
under the purview of the universal banks.
The British ﬁnancial system largely sepa-
rated investment banking, brokerage, and
commercial services; thus, comparing the
German universal banks to the British
deposit (commercial) banks underestimates
the share of corporate ﬁnancing institu-
tions in the British economy.  Nonetheless,
at 50 percent to 60 percent, deposit banks
and private banks accounted for twice the
share of total ﬁnancial institution assets 
in Britain than did the universal banks 
(of both joint-stock and private forms) 
in Germany.
Given the traditional emphasis on 
the universal banks’ role in promoting
industrialization and economic growth 
in Germany, the universal banks’ share 
in both ﬁnancial assets and GNP seems
relatively small.  Furthermore, the sharp
increase in the German universal banks’
share between 1900 and 1913—especially
compared to the more gradual changes
from 1860 to 1880—raises doubts about
the causal link between universal bank
expansion and industrial growth.
In contrast, British deposit banks’ share
of assets grew most rapidly between 1860
and 1880 and then leveled off.  While some
of the differences in these patterns likely
stem from divergent timing of industrial-
ization, part may arise from the varied
structure and practices of the British and
German banks.  The German universal
banks are widely believed to have internal-
ized the secondary market in securities, and
indeed a signiﬁcant portion of trading took
place through their ofﬁces.  The continued
expansion of universal banks, therefore,
may represent the expansion of the market
for securities.
Another measure of the volume of cap-
ital mobilized by the British and German
commercial banks is represented by total
bank assets less cash.  As a share of GNP, 
liabilities less cash in the British deposit
banks exceeded that in the German universal
banks by a signiﬁcant margin from 1883
until after the turn of the twentieth century
(Figure 1).  While the gap between the
United Kingdom and Germany seems to
have virtually disappeared by the outset 
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NOTES:  The British data come from the Economist series as reported in Sheppard (1971) and
include private banks, starting in 1891.  The solid line represents an estimation of the joint-
stock banks' liabilities from 1880 to 1913, based on the ratio of private to joint-stock banks
in 1891, but that ratio likely declined significantly between 1891 and 1913.  The German data 
report only joint-stock banks for the whole period.  Since the private banks accounted for a 
greater share of bank assets in Germany, the omission of private banks may exaggerate the 
British lead.  Even if estimated figures for the German private banks are added, however, some 
gap in liabilities less cash still remained as late as 1913.  Furthermore, the denominator for the 
German series is net national product, and the ratio may therefore overestimate bank liabilities 
as a share of GNP.  The GNP/NNP data come from Mitchell (1978).
SOURCES:  United Kingdom, Sheppard (1971) and Mitchell (1978); Germany, 
Deutsche Bundesbank (1976) and Mitchell (1978).
Total Joint-Stock Bank Liabilities Less
Total Cash Holdings, United Kingdom  
and Germany, 1880-19137 Regression of the log of liabili-
ties less cash on a time trend
yields an estimated annual
average growth rate of 8.6 
percent in the post-1894 peri-
od, as opposed to a rate of 
5.1 percent before1894.
8 To some extent, the apparently
late take-off by the universal
banks is due to the switch to
the joint-stock form.  Private
banks were more prevalent
before 1894 than after.
Inclusion of the private banks
would ﬂatten the trend some,
but it is not clear that the pri-
vate banks provided the same
services in the same way as
the later joint-stock banks.
9 See Champ and Freeman
(1994) and sources cited there.
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of World War I, the series again diverged
during the war and its aftermath.
Figure 1 also reveals a clear differ-
ence in growth rates of liabilities less 
cash per capita in the two countries.
When we take into account the shift 
in coverage for the British series, the 
trend for that country is relatively ﬂat.
The German ﬁgures, in contrast, indi-
cate gradual expansion before 1894, 
but rapid growth thereafter.7 The dis-
parity in growth rates may be explained 
by the different patterns of industrial
development in the two countries; 
however, the late development of the
German joint-stock banks is somewhat
surprising.  Joint-stock universal banking
seems to have taken off more than 40 
years after the ﬁrst universal bank was
founded and after the industrialization
pushes of the mid-nineteenth century.8
While the commercial banks clearly
represented a greater share of the economy
in the United Kingdom than in Germany,
the universal banks may have expanded
available capital at a faster rate.  Indeed,
the faster growth rate of German bank lia-
bilities compared to British bank liabilities
suggests this might have been the case.
The ultimate impact of the banks’ activ-
ities depends inversely upon the propor-
tion of the system’s assets retained as cash
reserves.  In a simple model of a monetary
economy, the total nominal money stock
is a function of the nominal monetary base
(currency plus reserves), the ratio of bank
deposits to currency, and the cash-to-reserve
ratio.9 Financial intermediaries maintain
partial control over both the reserve ratio
and the deposit-to-currency ratio.  For
example, banks can raise the deposit-to-
currency ratio by encouraging individuals
to deposit their savings or to buy equity
shares in the bank.  
Two measures offer some insight into
the banks’ roles in multiple expansion.  The
money multiplier is a negative function of
the cash-to-deposit ratio.  Where banks
are ﬁnanced by equity or private capital in
addition to deposits, a more relevant ratio
may be the cash-to-liabilities ratio.  In
comparing the British and German cases,
we ﬁnd both  ratios informative.10
Germany’s cash-to-liability ratio ranged
between 5 percent and 6 percent in the
late  1880s and early 1890s, but it declined
considerably after 1893.  This decline 
in the universal banks’ cash-to-liability ratio
coincided  with the growth of their liabil-
ities less cash.  Over the same period, the
British banks seem to have maintained
considerably higher cash-to-liability ratios,
and the gap appears to have widened
after 1893 (Figure 2).  
Theoretically, at least, the cash-to-
liability ratio affects monetary expansion,
interest rates, and economic growth.  Yet
banks’ holdings of cash are not exogenous,
and differences in funding methods between
British and German banks help explain 
part of the gap in cash-to-liability ratios.
Particularly in the nineteenth century,
British deposit banks ﬁnanced a much
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Germany-cash/deposit ratio for all joint-stock banks
U.K.-cash/deposti ratio, Sheppard's series for all banks
U.K. -cash/deposit ratio, Capie and Webber series for 
  joint-stock banks
Germany-cash/asset ratio for all joint-stock banks
U.K. - cash/asset ratio, Sheppard's series for all banks
NOTES:  Sheppard's series for all United Kingdom  banks includes private banks 
after 1890.  Capie and Webber's data on U.K. joint-stock banks include all Irish 
and Scottish banks.
SOURCES:  United Kingdom, Sheppard (1971) and Capie and Webber (1987); 
Germany, Deutsche Bundesbank (1976)
Germany
U.K.
Cash/Total Assets and Cash/Total Deposits
Cash-to-Asset and Cash-to-Deposit Ratios,  
United Kingdom and Germany  
1880-1913greater share of their operations with
deposits than did the German universal
banks, and United Kingdom provincial
banks (at least to some extent) also issued
notes.  Universal banks were prohibited
from issuing their own notes.  
Given the divergent liability structures
of German and British banks, the cash-to-
deposit ratio offers greater insight into the
banks’ participation in maturity transforma-
tion.11 Among the German universal banks,
cash-to-deposit ratios followed a similar,
though more extreme, pattern than cash-to-
liabilities ratios, rising over the late 1880s
and declining after 1893.  Until the last
years of the nineteenth century, German
cash-to-deposit ratios exceeded the United
Kingdom ratios, and the gap reached as
much as 10 percentage points around 1891.
The variability of cash ratios is also
important.  The largest German banks kept
aggregate ratios as low as 7 percent and as
high as 22 percent during this period.  The
British deposit banks, by comparison, held
relatively steady cash ratios throughout the
end of the nineteenth and the start of the
twentieth centuries.  As a group, the British
joint-stock banks maintained cash balances
between 10 percent and 15 percent 
of deposits.  
Though neither the British nor the
German banks were bound by minimum
reserve requirements in the pre-World War I
period, cash ratios often still depended  on
factors outside the banks’ control.  Even in
the absence of regulations, central monet-
ary authorities may tacitly impose a ratio 
on commercial banks.  In Britain, the
apparent  ﬂoor at 10 percent, while cer-
tainly not proof of the central bank’s role, 
is consistent with the notion that the Bank
of England held some sway over the banks’
minimum cash ratio.  The ratios for
Germany, however, suggest no successful
suasion by the Reichsbank.  Bankers, politi-
cians, and economists often debated the
need for a required reserve, but little was
done toward imposing regulations like 
those enacted in the United States.12
Clearly, many of the factors involved in
determining the cash-to-deposit ratio fall
outside the purview of the banks.  At the
same time, banks do retain signiﬁcant
control over their investment portfolios,
and the riskiness of those portfolios 
must also affect the banks’ assessment 
of their need for cash reserves.  A bank’s
structure and activities may measurably
inﬂuence the composition of its asset
portfolios, and the different levels of 
bank specialization may therefore partly
explain the somewhat divergent patterns
of cash ratios—and thus of capital expan-
sion—of British and German banks.
QUALITY OF INVESTMENTS
Banks’ role in mobilizing capital is inti-
mately tied to their involvement in the uti-
lization of funds.  Through decisions about
how to lend and invest funds, banks can
inﬂuence the quality of capital formation.  
As with capital mobilization, the structure 
of the German universal banks is thought 
by many to have offered advantages over 
the British system in promoting the efﬁcient
use of ﬁnancial capital.  The literatures on
German and British banking have suggested
that the British banks invested rather conser-
vatively, while the German banks opted for
riskier strategies.  Such risky investment, it is
argued, channeled funds into high-growth
and high-return industries and helped pro-
mote Germany’s industrialization.13
For inﬂuencing the quality of invest-
ment, the crucial organizational advantage
of the German banks is their supposed long-
term direct participation in industrial ﬁrms.
By holding industrial shares, the banks are
thought to have monitored and even con-
trolled the ﬁrms they ﬁnanced.  The British
banks, in contrast, are traditionally accused
of having little to do with industry and are
criticized for taking a short-term, arms-
length approach to industrial lending.
There are several theoretical reasons
why bank equity holdings may increase 
the efﬁciency of investment.  Many of these
hypotheses originate in the idea that asym-
metric information between borrowers and
lenders poses extra costs and creates inef-
ﬁciencies in the selection and funding of
investment projects.  Cost reductions 
may result from imposing discipline on
10The data for the two ratios come
from two sources: Sheppard’s
(1971 [1873]) compilation of
The Economist’s series and Capie
and Webber’s (1985) newer
estimates.  The latter only pro-
vide cash and deposit ﬁgures, so
the cash-to-liabilities ratio cannot
be calculated from this source.
11That is, changing short-term lia-
bilities into longer-term assets.
12Most proposals recommend-
ed required cash holdings of 
1 percent to 5 percent of the
sum of deposits and current
account balances to be held at
the Reichsbank.  Defenders of
the German joint-stock banks
claimed that the British banks
held much slimmer reserves
than the Germans.  The British
banks were accused of padding
their reserves for their semian-
nual statements of account.  See
Riesser (1910, 1911) and
sources cited there.  Goodhart
(1972) also discusses the report-
ing practices of British banks.
13Tilly (1986) points out that,
given that the main clientele of
the universal banks appears to
have been large, older, publicly
traded enterprises, the banks
may not have been actively
involved in risky, innovative
investment in general.
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14Myers and Majluf (1984) ana-
lyze many of these theoretical
issues and provide a formal
model of the potential subopti-
mality of investment under
asymmetric information.
15Repeated interaction naturally
adds the problem of renegotia-
tion.  Admati and Pﬂeiderer
(1994), Persons (1994), and
Dybvig and Zender (1991) all
address this question.
16The remainder of this section
borrows heavily from Fohlin
(1997c).
17Disaggregation for the German
ﬁgures begins only in 1912.
The  ﬁgures for the years before
that are estimated on the basis
of the lowest holdings of govern-
ment securities between 1912
and 1920 as well as on the
detailed account of one of the
great banks between 1896 and
1899.  The proportion for great
banks ranged from 17.6 percent
to 28.6 percent of total securi-
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management, overseeing investment 
planning and outcomes, optimizing 
risk-taking by ﬁrms, and aligning 
banks’ and ﬁrms’ incentives for long-
term beneﬁts.14
John, et. al. (1994) models the effects
of equity ownership on ﬁrms’ risk-taking
and shows that investment efﬁciency
increases with the proportion of bank
ﬁnancing held in the form of equity.
Imperfect oversight of investment choices
and outcomes creates incentives for ﬁrms
to use borrowed funds in an excessively
risky manner.  When banks maintain veto
power over the use of funds, pure debt
holdings induce them to minimize their
risks in order to guarantee a ﬁxed return.
Equity holdings, in contrast, encourage
banks to seek higher ﬁrm valuation.  
Thus, the greater the banks’ equity
holdings in the ﬁrm, the higher the 
banks’ incentives for efﬁcient tradeoff
between risk and expected return.  
In related work, Admati and Pﬂeiderer
(1994) also demonstrate the potential
importance of equity stakeholders in
resolving agency problems associated with
multiperiod ﬁnancial contracts.  Explicitly
motivated by modern perceptions of the
German and Japanese banking systems,
this model shows that the efﬁciency of
inside investing hinges on the use of ﬁxed
fraction contracts.  In such arrangements,
the investor receives a ﬁxed percentage of
project returns and ﬁnances that same 
proportion of future investments.15
According to these theoretical argu-
ments, banks that hold equity stakes in
firms improve the ﬁrms’ investment efﬁ-
ciency.  Thus, the relative extent of equity
holdings in the portfolios of British and
German ﬁrms offers one way to assess
banks’ direct involvement in raising 
investment quality.16 Figure 3 compares
nongovernment securities for the two
countries.  Because of uncertainties about
valuation and reporting, these ﬁgures
should be viewed as approximations.17
The German banks show no consistent
tendency toward higher securities holdings
than the British banks.  Indeed, according to
these estimates, the range was nearly identical
in the two countries (7 percent to 12 percent
for the German banks and 8 percent to 12
percent for the British).  The ﬁgures, it should
be noted, provide as conservative an estimate
as possible of the German and British non-
government securities holdings.  The Scottish
and Irish deposit banks held higher levels of
investments than did their English and Welsh
counterparts, and the largest of the German
universal banks held more of their assets in
securities than did the provincial banks.
Therefore, the fact that Figure 3 still shows
the British banks’ securities holdings on par
with the Germans’ provides a strong indication
that, despite the measurement difﬁculties,
the British banks held a position  in non-
government securities similar to that of the
German banks.
Such a ﬁnding would fall in line with
expectations if one thought that the two
types of banks were roughly similar.  The
predominance of underwriting and bro-
kerage functions among the universal banks,
however, should have led to higher levels
of securities holdings at German banks,
compared to British commercial banks.
Figure 3
Securities/Assets
NOTES:  Figures for the United Kingdom include England and Wales only and include private 
banks after 1890.  Figures for Germany include great banks only (large Berlin banks).  
See explanation in text.
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Thus far, the numbers for the German
banks have included securities holdings
resulting from their underwriting and 
brokerage business.18 A signiﬁcant por-
tion of the universal banks’ total invest-
ments arose out of their involvement in
underwriting consortia (or syndicates).
These participations therefore include
some shares that remained on the banks’
books only temporarily and because of 
the banks’ inability to place the shares.  It
is useful to compare the estimates for the
largest German banks to the securities
holdings of British institutions engaged 
in investment banking.  Cottrell (1985)
shows that, at least in some cases, British
investment banks held more than half their
assets in the form of illiquid investments.  By
contrast, the German universal banks
reported liquidity coefﬁcients (the ratio of
immediately available or quick assets to 
total liabilities) of 85 percent in 1893.
These ﬁgures gradually declined by more
than 20 points over the ensuing 15 years.19
Naturally,  these banks cannot be compared
directly with the German universal banks,
but the forgoing examples do support the
notion that the great banks in particular,
because of their active engagement in 
investment banking, should be expected 
to have held a signiﬁcantly greater share of
their assets in the form of securities than 
did the British deposit banks.  Comparison
with the British investment banks also
underscores the potential inconsistency in
the idea that universal banks could hold
substantial long-term (illiquid) engagements
with industrial ﬁrms and still operate a com-
mercial business  on the order of the British
deposit banks.
To understand how important the banks’
direct investment in industrial compa-
nies may have been for the growth of the
economy, it is useful to combine the data on
bank investments with those on bank assets
relative to the economy as a whole.  Table 1
reports the results of this calculation and
indicates that the nongovernment securities
holdings of universal banks ranged between
2 percent and 4 percent of GNP for the three
decades preceding World War I.  Even if the
estimates are only approximately correct,
the banks’ holdings of nongovernment secu-
rities accounted for a very small share of the
economy.  The German banks’ share did
increase after 1880, but their holdings of
nongovernment securities still amounted to
only 4 percent of GNP by 1913.  Further-
more, the biggest part of the increase came
after the major push of industrialization 
in Germany.
The British banks’ holdings of non-
government securities were also low rela-
tive to GNP; in contrast to the German
case, however, the banks’ securities share
of GNP rose between 1880 and 1900 and
then leveled off.  Given the measurement
difﬁculties already discussed, and the like-
lihood that securities accounted for a greater
share of the economy in Britain than in
Germany, it is best not to overemphasize
the differences between the German and
British numbers.20 Nonetheless, these cal-
culations cast doubt on the idea that the
banks’ holdings of securities provided a
signiﬁcant stimulus to either the German
or the British economies during the last
half of the nineteenth century.
It is often claimed that the British
banks held only gilt-edged securities in
their portfolios, and that the German 
banks participated more actively and
directly in risky, start-up ventures.  The
ofﬁcial ﬁgures, however, do not allow 
speciﬁc types of securities to be distin-
guished.  Such distinctions, unfortu-
nately, depend on spottier evidence from
individual banks.  German bank records
for the pre-1880 period are generally
unavailable.  Nonetheless, some details 
are available for two of the earliest German










SOURCE:  Calculated from Deutsche Bundesbank (1976) and Goldsmith (1969).
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Bank Holdings of Non-Government
Securities/GNP
ties held between 1912 and
1920.  Given that this period
covers World War I, it would be
natural to expect that govern-
ment securities might comprise a
higher proportion of securities
than they did in the preceding
years.  In the one detailing of
bank securities holdings that I
could ﬁnd for the period before
1900 (Bank für Handel und
Industrie, a great bank), govern-
ment securities amounted to 24
percent to 55 percent of total
securities (in the period 1896-
99).  Thus, since I am trying to
err on the side of ﬁnding high
rates of nongovernment securi-
ties holdings, 17 percent seemed
a conservativeenough estimate
of the proportion of all great
bank securities held in the form
of government securities.
18According to Riesser (1910),
the largest universal banks
earned approximately half of
their gross proﬁts from under-
writing and brokerage services.
19Riesser (1911), p. 655, 
discusses the banks’ liquidity 
at length.
20Banks’ equity holdings may 
actually represent a greater 
proportion of share capital in
Germany than in the United
Kingdom.  Such ﬁgures are inter-
esting from the point of view of
the banks’ involvement in the
secondary market for shares, but
the banks’ ultimate impact must 
be measured against the 
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Gesellschaft (DG) and the Darmstädter Bank
(Bank für Handel und Industrie, or BHI).21
The DG held no securities in its ﬁrst
four years, but the proportion of securities
holdings rose to around 12 percent of 
assets in 1856 and grew rapidly over the
following few years.  The bank seems to
have unloaded securities during the boom
years of the early 1870s, but it then took
on extremely high shares of securities
during the middle of that decade.  While
the bank’s holdings continued to ﬂuctuate
throughout the remainder of the nine-
teenth century, the proportion of securi-
ties followed a generally downward trend
toward the end of the period.
Between 1856 and 1865, two mining
companies accounted for the vast majority
of DG’s industrial holdings, averaging
around 11 percent of bank assets during
this period.  Direct participation arose out
of the bank’s intention to convert the ﬁrms
into joint-stock companies, but because of
the thin market for the securities, DG was
forced to hold these companies’ shares
until the bank could extricate itself in the
more favorable market of the late 1860s
and early 1870s.
The remainder of DG’s securities 
portfolio was held in relatively conserva-
tive investments: government debt, railway
shares and bonds, and other priority bonds
and shares.  With the exception of a few
minor holdings of shares, the DG con-
ﬁned its participation in industry to three
companies (the two already discussed 
plus another mining concern).  Indeed, 
the bank’s holdings of industry stocks
amounted to between zero percent and 
3 percent of its assets for the years in
which disaggregated data are available
(1852-65).22
Tilly (1967) shows in his discussion 
of the early industrial promotion activi-
ties of the Bank für Handel und Industrie,
another of the great banks, that while the
bank was energetic in such activities in 
its ﬁrst four years, it had difﬁculty placing
shares at reasonable prices.  By the early
1860s, BHI had extricated itself from this
side of the business and had turned to
railway and government ﬁnance.  Thus, 
it can hardly be argued that even the early
activities of the great banks included
extensive, direct involvement in indus-
trial companies.
Economic historians can pick up 
this story in the 1880s by using evidence
from BHI.23 Holdings of industrial shares
amounted to less than 1 percent of BHI’s
assets for most of the 1880s and ’90s, and
even at its peak, the proportion of indus-
trial shares to assets reached only 1.3 per-
cent (in 1882).24 Moreover, BHI reported
substantial holdings of only 12 different
companies between 1882 and 1897 and 
no more than seven ﬁrms in any one year.
Together, these data provide further sup-
port for the notion that the great banks
invested a relatively small portion of 
their portfolios in long-term stakes in
industrial ﬁrms.25
As for the securities holdings in Britain,
Goodhart provides some details for three
British commercial banks (Metropolitan
Bank, London and Midland, and Union
Bank).  Nearly all of the investments
reported consisted of British, colonial, or
foreign-government securities or railway
stocks and bonds.  Given his warnings
about the banks’ desire to hide any invest-
ments in industrial ﬁrms, it is impossible 
to tell for sure what industrial shares the
banks may have held.  Edelstein, however,
has provided more general estimates of U.K.
securities holdings, and those results indi-
cate an expansion of industrial holdings
between 1871 and 1913.  Industrial con-
cerns and railways, both foreign and
domestic, accounted for 37 percent of all
securities holdings in 1871 and 62 percent
by World War I.  Home company holdings
alone increased from 4 percent to 17 percent
of all U.K. holdings over the period.26
For the period between 1883 and 1907,
Davis and Huttenback (1986) ﬁnd that the
financial community owned around 5 per-
cent of U.K. share value and averaged 4
percent stakes in those companies.  In
addition, public companies, some of which
may have been banks, held nearly 4 percent
of domestic share capital.  The banks might
be expected to have participated to some
extent in these investments, though ﬁrm
MAY/JUNE 1998
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detailed accounts of its securi-
ties holdings, and until 1899,
Saling’s reproduced the infor-
mation in its series on Berlin-
listed companies.
24Fohlin (1997c).
25While the experiences of two
banks may not necessarily be
generalized to the population
as a whole, these two banks
do represent a signiﬁcant pro-
portion of the great banks.
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proof of such a contention is apparently
unavailable.  Yet even if the British banks
held no industrial shares, the evidence for
DG and BHI suggests that the German uni-
versal banks were not far ahead on this count.
It is important to note that the banks’
ownership of shares, at the margin, may have
provided important injections of liquidity or
signals of quality for newly public ﬁrms.  In a
thin market for industrial securities, and in
cases of lumpy investments, such holdings
may permit ﬁrms to invest when they other-
wise would not have.  Thus, small and tran-
sient equity stakes may increase the quantity
of investment, even if they do not have the
qualitative, efﬁciency effects that long-term
holdings are thought to have.  Since such
equities may not have made it onto the banks’
books, though, it is difﬁcult to estimate the
ultimate impact of transient holdings.
Share ownership represents only the
most direct kind of involvement in indus-
trial ﬁrms.  The banks may have also par-
ticipated indirectly in companies, either
through proxy voting of customers’ shares
or through positions in the ﬁrms’ super-
visory boards.27 Because of their combi-
nation  of underwriting, brokerage, and
commercial services, the German banks
probably obtained greater control of indus-
trial shares than did the British banks.
Since shares taken as collateral or simply
held as a service  to customers would not
appear in the banks’  balance sheets, and
since ﬁrms did not have to reveal their
shareholders, it is virtually impossible to
quantify the extent of proxy voting by 
the German banks.
It is possible to quantify board posi-
tions, and such data suggest that the bank
directors held positions in relatively few
companies.  Approximately 23 percent of
German joint-stock companies had a private
banker or bank manager on their supervi-
sory boards, but only half of these attached
companies received representation from the
great banks.28
Proxy votes and supervisory board posi-
tions may have enabled banks to monitor
their investments and even control the use of
bank funds.  From a theoretical perspective,
however, it is unclear whether such indirect
participation yields the same kind of incen-
tive effects as direct ownership.  In theory, at
least, systems in which banks exert control
over investment decisions but do not align
their incentives with those of the ﬁrms
through equity stakes force ﬁrms into exces-
sively safe and thus inefﬁcient investment
programs.  So the German system of proxy
voting and interlocking directorates may
have increased bank control and oversight,
but it may have led to more internal
ﬁnancing and fewer risky investments.
CONCLUSION
The ﬁnancial system may promote real
growth of the economy by enhancing the
quantity, quality, or efﬁciency of invest-
ment.  Using evidence on bank ﬁnancial
structure, this study has compared the 
contributions of the British and German
banking systems in the ﬁrst two of these
areas.  The analysis yields no compelling
evidence that one system consistently or sig-
niﬁcantly outperformed the other in raising
the quantity or quality of investment.
The ﬁndings indicate that the German
universal banks, despite their broader
involvement in corporate ﬁnance, accounted
for a markedly smaller proportion of the
economy than did the British banks.  The
gap of the 1880s, much of which may have
been due to the later onset of industrializa-
tion in Germany than in Britain, only began
to diminish after 1894 and never fully dis-
appeared.  The universal banks may have,
however, expanded their available capital 
at a faster rate, since they invested or lent 
a greater share of their total liabilities than
did the British banks.  The disparity in cash-
to-liability ratios, however, stems from the
heavily deposit-based ﬁnancing of the British
banks.  Until the late 1890s, the German
banks actually maintained more conserva-
tive coverage of short-term liabilities than
did the U.K. banks.  Only with the serious
onset of the deposit business in the mid-
1890s did the German cash-to-deposit ratios
begin their steady decline.
The German banks are frequently
credited for their active participation in
industry, and bank equity positions in
27The German supervisory 
board comprises shareholders’
representatives.  Currently, this
body must also represent the
ﬁrm’s workers.
28Fohlin (1997a, b) discuss the
prevalence, sectoral distribution,
and determinants of interlocking
directorates between banks 
and ﬁrms.ﬁrms are thought to improve the quality 
of investment.  The ﬁndings show, how-
ever, that the universal banks held only a
small share of their portfolios in the form
of industrial equities.  Evidence from two
of the largest universal banks suggests that
the universal banks held stakes in only a
few ﬁrms and often did so for lack of
demand for their shares.  Based on the 
theoretical work on bank equity stakes,
this article also argues that if the German
banks wielded greater control over ﬁrms
(through board positions, for example)
than did the British banks but took no
greater equity stakes in those ﬁrms, then
the German system of relationship bank-
ing may actually have led to relative under-
investment in risky projects.
This study has raised the possibility that
the German banks’ choices of investment and
reserve holdings were constrained by the
extent  of the secondary market in securities.
It is possible that the dominance of universal
banking in Germany  may have hampered the
growth of complementary ﬁnancial institu-
tions.  In the German case, however, regulation
that encouraged the growth of universal
banking also may have inhibited the devel-
opment of securities markets.  Thus, the
existence of universal banking, per se, may
not curtail the functioning of securities markets.
Clearly, further work on this subject 
is required.  But if specialized and uni-
versal systems of ﬁnance generally provide
similar quantities and qualities of invest-
ment, then cost-efﬁciency may prove to be
the crucial determinant of the relative
growth effects of the two systems.  Univer-
sal banking may yield economies of scale
or scope compared to a specialized system,
but these economies may also lead to exces-
sive concentration, market power, and inef-
ﬁciency in the banking sector.  In addition,
the internalization of the secondary securi-
ties market within the banking system may
hamper both the efﬁcient distribution of
ﬁnancial capital and the market for corpo-
rate control.  Such factors bear directly on
the costs of ﬁnance, and such costs inﬂu-
ence economic growth.
This study narrows the perceived gulf
between the British and German banking
systems; and it indicates quite strongly that
without a signiﬁcant period of real develop-
ment, ﬁnancial institutions can offer only
limited beneﬁts for economic growth.29 It
may still be true that the German economy
has outperformed its British counterpart
over the past century, but this study suggests
that differences in banking structure are
probably not the cause.  Such ﬁndings may
prove useful for policymakers both in fore-
casting the effects of banking deregulation
in the United States and in formulating
development programs in other parts of 
the world.
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